In the first part of the article, I describe the origins of neoliberal developmental states in CEE. I start with the outline of administrative reforms during the age of the Washington consensus and examine how the neo-liberal legal policies and theories affected the administrative structures built in that period. I try to show that under the influence of the neoliberal "rule of law" model CEE developed a distinct, neoliberal developmental state. During the early stage of administrative reforms, they followed a one-size-fits-all approach and hastened to transplant various Western-style administrative structures without paying sufficient attention to social context and disregarding the policy relevance of such rules. I use the example of civil service reforms because they were at the epicenter of the first stage of administrative reforms. In the second part of the article, I discuss the EU-inspired innovation development policies, which gradually emerged as a major albeit truncated version of developmental policy in CEE. But then again, the inadequacy of the administrative structures built during the early stage of transition turned out to be one of the key inhibiting factors that prevented these new development policies from succeeding.
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No. 50 | February 2013 reforms was dominant, the new developmental states emphasized the state"s capacity "to coordinate agents, stabilize their confidence in the states" behavior and establish national development as an urgent overarching project." 18 As the key features of these NDS, Wade lists evenly balanced power between the state and the business, an activist, public service oriented mindset of public officials, creation of bifurcated political and economic administrative structures, and an absence of significant discretionary power of budget resources on the side of public officials who are doing the nudging of private firms. 19 In the first part of the article, I describe the origins of neoliberal developmental states in CEE. I start with the outline of administrative reforms during the age of the Washington consensus and examine how the neo-liberal legal policies and theories affected the administrative structures built in that period. I try to show that under the influence of the neoliberal "rule of law" model CEE developed a distinct, neoliberal developmental state. During the early stage of administrative reforms, they followed a one-size-fits-all approach and hastened to transplant various Western-style administrative structures without paying sufficient attention to social context and disregarding the policy relevance of such rules. I use the example of civil service reforms because they were at the epicenter of the first stage of administrative reforms.
In the second part of the article, I discuss the EU-inspired innovation development policies, which gradually emerged as a major albeit truncated version of developmental policy in CEE. But then again, the inadequacy of the administrative structures built during the early stage of transition turned out to be one of the key inhibiting factors that prevented these new development policies from succeeding.
However, as the Strategy for Poland, the only alternative development strategy to the
Washington consensus in the region shows, selection of adequate economic policies is as important as the creation of adequate legal and political institutions. Poland achieved remarkable economic results with institutions which were considered to be inadequate by actors like the EU, the World Bank and IMF. I conclude with general observations about the importance of CEE examples for development policies of other middle-income countries (MICs) in the region.
II. What Kind of Developmental State: Institutions or Policies?
The situation in CEE countries could not be more different. CEE countries face the current economic crisis with regulatory structures and policies that are quite different from the ones of NDS. Under the strong influence of the Washington consensus and its rule of law paradigm, they developed a distinct type of developmental state, a neoliberal developmental state. Not an oxymoron, this type of developmental state is characterized by excessively formalized regulatory structures, a strong reliance on pro market (neoliberal) economic policies and an almost complete neglect of autonomous developmental policies. As a consequence, CEE are ill prepared to tackle new challenges described by the PWC. While there is, as a result of the current economic crisis, an increased functional demand for all kinds of new regulatory policies and structures, there is only a few high quality regulatory structures and policies in place in CEE. Namely, civil service is prone to politicization and corruption, the public sector (education, health care) is in grave need of modernization and various regulatory bodies and structures outside the core government (anti corruption commissions, developmental agencies etc) lack necessary independence and credibility. And paradoxically, there is still very little demand in these countries for autonomous developmental policies. But, as we are reminded by the "post Washington consensus", "development has never been something that the rich bestowed on the poor but rather something the poor achieved for themselves." 20 CEE countries are no exception. In other words, without appropriate development structures and policies in place they may well remain a periphery or the "unfinished part of Europe".
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No. 50 | February 2013 (MICs) in terms of good governance indicators such as the rule of law, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality. 23 As far as rule of law is concerned, Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary are the top performers among CEE. However, if we compare the same indicators over the last 12 years for the same group of countries, we find only small improvements or no improvements at all. The World Bank"s ongoing study of good governance concludes that there is no evidence of any significant improvement in governance worldwide. 24 The latest Nations in Transit In other words, despite much enthusiasm since they had joined the EU, which led serious thinkers to declare that while CEE may not look exactly like the old member states, they nonetheless belong to the same broad category of democratic and liberal states, the picture of CEE today is not so rosy. As a leading economic historian,
Berend, observes:
Looking back to the last two centuries, the picture is rather depressing. According to the New Institutional Economics (NIE), an influential economic theory, institutions are a key variable which distinguishes between successful and failed development. 30 Under the influence of such thinking, the IMF and the World Bank substituted the market-oriented Washington consensus with a good governance regime which sees the poor quality of institutions as the root cause of economic problems in developing countries. 31 Interestingly, although the good governance approach attributes high importance to institutions, its theory about "proper"
institutions is not so different from its predecessor, the Washington consensus. 32 According to the good governance approach, it is mostly institutions that maximize market freedom and most strongly protect private property rights, which are the best for economic development. One of the leading developmental economists, Chang, criticizes this approach as assuming that the causality runs from institutions to economic development and neglecting the other direction, where economic development creates better institutions. As he argues, there is substantial historical evidence showing that the causality may be stronger in the latter direction:
Today"s rich countries acquired most of the institutions that today"s dominant view considers to be prerequisities of economic development after, not before, their economic development-democracy, modern bureaucracy, IPRs, limited liability, bankruptcy law, banking, the central bank, securities regulation, and so on. 33 Chang"s arguments have two important implications for the development theory.
First, if Chang is right about the causality, then developing countries would be better off to invest financial and human resources in policies that "more directly stimulate economic development-be they educational expenditure, infrastructural expenditure, or industrial subsidies-especially when they also indirectly promote institutional development, which can they further promote economic development." 34 In other words, instead of trying to copy the institutions from developed countries, they should develop their own development policy, which should be more directly oriented toward economic development and growth. 
III. Building Neo-Liberal States in Central and

Eastern Europe
Reforms of national administration in CEE countries were not a key policy priority during the initial stage of the transition. Given the anti-statist bias prevalent among the reformers of that time, this is not surprising. It is only during the accession negotiations with the EU that administrative reforms became an important item on the policy agenda of the CEE governments. More precisely, with very few exceptions, most of the governments started with various reforms of public administration only in the second half of the 1990s. Before that period, the neoliberal development experts were more interested in un-building and dis-establishing prior communist state structures than in building new ones.
As one early study on the transition reports, the neoliberal experts deliberately weakened potential agents of industrial restructuring in the region. For example, in Weberian model of centralized hierarchy, with the emphasis on formalization of civil service management and the minimization of managerial discretion, which are needed to strengthen the principles of legality, professionalism, impartiality and depoliticization. 40 The Weberian model comes close to the continental Rechtsstaat tradition of public administration with its roots in Max Weber"s ideal type of rational/legal bureaucracy. 41 There was not much discussion of the New Public Management (NPM) model 42 The pre-accession civil service systems in CEE suffered from some common problems and dysfunctions. These systems were plagued by a strong politicisation of civil service, an absence of a culture of political neutrality, a lack of mobility in civil service personnel policy, decentralisation and fragmentation of personnel and pay policy, the lack of a central agency responsible for the recruitment and dismissal of civil servants, poorly paid staff, and last but not least, a poor image of the civil service. Verheijen argues that adoption of civil service laws "has not resolved the problems of instability and politicisation and has rarely led to the development of a well-working system of long-term career development." 45 A World Bank study also reports about "a mixed picture of overall setbacks, especially since accession with some promising innovations, particularly in the Baltic States." 46 One of the setbacks has to do with the return of politicization. The study reports that "the very idea of an impartial and professional civil service, based on merit and continuity, appears to have lost its appeal to the political leadership of most of the new Member States." 47 Quite paradoxically, few years after the accession, the politicization of civil service in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Slovakia has reached a critical point, leading Adam
Michnik to declare the Polish civil service corrupt. 48 itself. Yet, in all CEE we can discern almost a fetishist focus on the production of new legislation which was often dissociated from its own implementation. Such processes often degenerated into "symbolic politics" resulting in adoption of laws which cannot be enforced.
Institution building and/or development policies: the Polish alternative?
As the example of civil service reforms shows, CEE, with the Baltic exception, still lack a competent and professional bureaucracy which is sufficiently capable and autonomous from political patronage. And yet, "promoting effective public sectors is one of the most daunting development challenges that the world faces." 58 64 It is an excessive focus on rules and legislation, disassociated from policy goals and social context, which has largely contributed to the creation of such "formal structures without substance": i.e, institutions which look similar to its Western style counterparts, but fail to produce expected results. the entire state sector, Kolodko"s government implemented a commercialization of the public sector, which meant that state-owned enterprises were exposed to competitive pressure and subjected to tough budget constraints, similarly to the private sector. On the other hand, privatization was "rationalized" in order to help improve the double goal of microeconomic efficiency and maximizing government revenue. In short, "neoliberal doctrinarism was abandoned for a pragmatic approach based on economic rationalism". 72 Kolodko"s government was also aware of the importance of institutional infrastructure required to make a market economy function. 73 Last but not least, Poland emphasized some things which were usually neglected by the IMF, such as the importance of democratic support for the reforms, which entailed its concern to keep unemployment low, to provide benefits for the unemployed and to adjust pensions for inflation, and also the importance of public dialogue and social partnership with trade unions and business organizations. Polish economic "success" is not without its own contradictions and problems. 75 However, according to the new institutional economics, given the low-quality of the Polish bureaucracy at the time, such poor-quality institutions could not have lead to spectacular economic and social results as achieved in Poland. In order to explain the success of "East European tiger", we have to return to the critique of NIE as developed by Chang and Fukuyama.
As Chang argues, the choice of appropriate policies, especially when they also indirectly promote institutional development, may be more important for development than the design of institutions as such. As he argues, the causality often runs from economic development, economic policies to institutions. Kolodko, being himself very much aware of the institutional aspects of development, has contributed a lot to the subject of the theory of systemic change in transition economies 76 as well to unorthodox development economics. 77 Instead of focusing on the neoliberal formalized approach to institutions, Kolodko"s government adopted more pragmatic and policy-oriented style of administrative reforms. Special attention was given to the recruitment of qualified people, special programmes for teaching and training were established, and special code/regulation on civil service was introduced. Kolodko was doing his best to engage the non partisan technocrats and pay them as much as the budget could afford. 78 This was quite different from other CEE which were mostly preoccupied with building "ideal" institutions as propagated by the neoliberal "good governance"
doctrine. With such "imperfect" institutions, the Polish government pursued pragmatic economic policies which in combination contributed to spectacular economic results.
Therefore, the Polish alternative strategy does not show that institutions are not important. What it shows is that "effective institutions have to evolve indigenously, reflecting a country"s own political, social, and cultural realities….Institutions such as the rule of law will rarely work if they are simply copied from abroad; societies must buy into their content. industrial revolution with governments that were substantially more corrupt and less capable than they are today. 80 What matters most is that institutions are relevant and appropriate for a country"s development goals and policies, and second, that institution building is not treated as something prior or separate from formulation of development policies. And, as the Polish case reveals, it is equally important that country has a "right" development policy in the first place. By rejecting the neoliberal orthodoxy of "do-nothing" industrial policy and replacing it with more pragmatic "heterodox" economic policies, Poland achieved better economic results than countries which simply followed the neoliberal advice.
The second major exception to "do-nothing" industrial or development policy in CEE is the innovation policy which was heavily promoted and supported by the EU structural funds starting in 2004.
IV. Towards neoliberal developmental states in CEE Example: Innovation policy as development policy
Since 2004, innovation policies in CEE represent the most important form of industrial policy with a much more active role of the state. 81 During the first stage of transition, innovation policy was basically substituted by the Washington consensus policies of "structural adjustment". The innovation policy proper was not considered important to the neo-liberal development experts. Almost all economic capacity building was directed toward macroeconomic issues:
Industrial policy thinking of the early transition governments was characterized by an outspoken liberal approach, leaving structural change entirely to the market. 82 Already in the late 1990s, such an approach to industrial policy gradually began to shift to various forms of more horizontal innovation, technology, and regional policies, all representing an EU "implicit" version of industrial policy. All these various policies are part of the EU cohesion policy, which aims to reduce social and economic disparities and is conceptualized as "a partial counterbalance to the natural effects of the internal market by promoting a more balanced distribution of resources and economic development across the EU." However, as it turned out later, it was precisely this decentralized and fragmented institutional network which caused some major problems in developing successful innovation policies in the region. As one comparative study of innovation policy in the region argues, one of the major problems was caused by "increasing usage of independent implementation agencies in an already weak administrative capacity environment lacking policy skills for networking and long-term planning." 85 As a consequence, while Europeanization of innovation policy has had many positive effects, it has also contributed to "deepening and exasperating the existing problems of networking and coordinaton" 86 in CEE regulatory framework. Moreover, "the lack of tradition of partnership and inter-institutional coordination and cooperation between administrative levels on the other hand, meant that most positive effects of such agencies were not reaped and that they created in some cases more difficulties and problems than they solved." 87 What is particularly interesting is not that such problems existed during the accession period but that they were exacerbated during the current period. The same study reports that "almost all CEE innovation policy implementation problems go back to very weak and disorganized actors, coordination problems are rampant in policy design and innovation/industry on the ministerial level and its delivery system." 88 The fragmented policy making system suffered from acute absence of cooperation and learning between different actors like governments, industry and research organizations. In other words, creation of multiple independent agencies was one of the key innovation policy problems in CEE.
As different comparative studies on independent agencies show, one of the most difficult tasks is to create agencies which are sufficiently independent but flexible enough (which usually means not too independent) to allow policy coordination. 89 Too much independence, coupled with fragmentation of the number of agencies, could lead to severe coordination problems between the principals (ministries, development bodies) and agents (independent agencies), as well as between the agencies themselves. In such a context, it is not clear formal rules which usually help to ameliorate coordination problems, but other factors such as administrative culture, shared policy agenda among the actors, and informal channels of coordination. Most of these informal prerequisites are simply lacking in the CEE context. To make things worse, at the top of the system sits civil service which also lacks most of the attributes important for policy coordination of the entire framework.
Innovation policies in CEE also suffer from wrong substantive policy choices which are not necessarily related to the previously described problems of policy structures.
One of them has to do with a linear understanding of innovation ("from lab to market") which assumes that there is a growing demand from industry for innovation products resulting from innovation policy:
Innovation is seen as something close to science and invention, and that there is a more or less linear correspondence between scientific discovery and high innovation performance, and that innovations behave like Nokia"s mobile phones and thus search for the la became the holy grail of CEE innovation policy. 90 It is no surprise then that many of the innovation policies tend to solve the problems which are nonexistent in the industry. While the industry specializes in just few research-intensive and high skill products, the innovation policies concentrate on high technology sectors, on commercializing university research, technology parks for start-ups etc. Furthermore, the innovation policies are horizontal and less focused on While the example of innovation policy clearly shows the importance of an adequate institutional framework for a successful developmental policy, it also reveals that creating appropriate institutions is not a separate process from devising appropriate policies themselves. In other words, the structure of a neoliberal developmental state, created to promote neoliberal agenda, turned out to be inadequate for "post neoliberal"
innovation/development policies. The example is also important because it comes closest to examples of new forms of developmental policies as practiced by NDS.
Trubek offers a list of key features of NDS. Among them we can find organized systems for public-private information sharing, cooperative public-private efforts to construct regulatory regimes that foster global competitiveness and domestic efficiency, extensive collaboration and communication between public and private sectors, an emphasis on innovation, and new product development etc. 92 As he further argues,
It is impossible to know the right developmental paths in advance, finding these paths requires experimentation, experimentation must involve public-private collaboration, and a successful path must include the appropriate legal and regulatory framework….policy must be flexible enough to permit a variety of efforts and regulatory frameworks must be sufficiently revisable so that the fruits of learning can easily be incorporated…If we wanted to sum up the NPED in a few words, it might be in envisioning development as a process of discovery in which the state seeks to empower the private sector and state and market function best when they are linked in collaborative structures that foster experimentation and revision. without paying enough attention to other informal features required for such collaborative and decentralized policy framework to deliver expected results.
More informal approaches to institution building of regulatory structures are not found only among East Asian countries. 94 They are also found in a diverse group of countries including Brazil, South Africa, and India. One cannot fail to notice a stark difference between an almost obsessive focus on formalization of administrative structures in CEE, and a more informal approach among the new developmental states. One lesson for CEE thus seems to be that these countries should abandon the overly formalistic approach to institution building and replace it with a new approach which understands the rule of law in a more informal, pragmatic and revisable fashion. This is not to say that the rule of law does not require formalization to a certain degree. My point is that a proper mix of formal and informal rules can be found and designed only through an indigenous process of institution building which allows each nation to design its development policy and institutions according to its own needs and traditions. 95 The ideology of legal transplants, so typical for the age of such a tradition should be more careful. 105 All these suggest that one of the top priorities for MICs should be promotion of effective public sectors. This will be especially difficult task in countries which have consolidated authoritarian or semiauthoritarian regimes. One of the prerequisites of effective public service is its autonomy and meritocracy. How to create such a bureaucracy in authoritarian regimes which also lack the legacy of a strong technocratic bureaucracy? As Birdsall and were rather a result than a cause of their economic development. Mungiu-Pippidi come to almost the same conclusion: "The explanation for the performance of historical achievers is not to be found in their present organization (legislation, political institutions) which should not be viewed as a cause, since it acts for the maintenance, rather than the creation, of good governance." 107 This is particularly important for MICs which should avoid the institutional fetishism as promoted by the advocates of the Washington consensus. They should invest more in economic policies likely to promote economic development and approach institution building more pragmatically than other HICs from the region did. This is not to argue that institutions are not important but only to reverse the priorities and follow certain elements of the East Asian Model for development as described by Peerenboom.
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They should initially focus on economic growth, adopt a pragmatic approach to economic reforms but as the economy grows and wealth is generated, they should invest in human capital and institutions.
As a leading developmental economist argues, adopting such "second best"
institutions in developing countries is a much better choice than trying to emulate the best practice institutions. The second best institutions are those that take into account context-specific market and government failures that cannot be removed in short order. As such, they promise more effective institutional framework conducive for economic development than "best practice" institutions, which are "almost by definition, not contextual and do not take account these complications". 109 Almost the same conclusion is reached by Haggard, MacIntyre and Tiede in their systematic review of the literature dealing with relationship between the rule of law and economic development: "Yet for countries at low levels of development, the types of informal institutions that generated trade in early modern Europe may be more 
